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An analysis of the monopoly 
power of private banks 
Robert T. Devlin* 
In 1982 Latin America began to encounter serious 
difficulties in servicing its external debt and by mid-
year most of the countries heavily in debt to the inter-
national private banks —their leading creditors— in-
itiated negotiations to reprogramme payments. The 
Latin American debt was contracted during the 1970s 
in a highly competitive and expanding capital mar-
ket, which afforded the countries an opportunity to 
obtain abundant loans on favourable terms. In view 
of the present depressive international conjuncture, 
however, many banks have stopped lending to Latin 
America. The flow of credit has therefore been se-
verely reduced, and the market has been left in the 
hands of a few large international banks whose main 
activity has been the administration of their existing 
portfolio through the reprogramming of amortiza-
tion and the refinancing of part of the interest pay-
ments, which has led to a drastic deterioration of 
credit terms and a substantial rise in the cost of bor-
rowing. The present study maintains that this in-
crease in the cost of the debt as a result of the re-
negotiation is nothing but a monopoly rent which is 
extracted from the countries by virtue of the 
emergence of a non-competitive capital market. It is 
suggested here that countries should explore ways of 
eliminating —totally or partly— these superprofits, 
because, in so far as they are rents, their non-pay-
ment should not prevent reprogramming of the debt 
or future access to credit. 
In contrast to what happened during the 1930s, 
the so far brurjt of the cost of weathering the finan-
cial crisis has been borne by the debtor countries, a 
politically untenable situation. To forestall the de-
faults that everyone would wish to prevent, formulas 
are suggested which may perhaps permit a more 
equitable distribution of the cost among the banks, 
their governments and the debtor countries. 
'Economic Development Division, ECLA. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful com-
ments made by H. Assael, E. de la Piedra, M. Guerguil, C. 
Massad, J. Ramos and R. Zahler on the first draft of the 
present article, and the excellent statistical assistance 
given him by G. Mundt. 
I 
Int roduct ion 
Latin America's present debt crisis is very wide-
spread. Since mid-1982 more than half the 
countries of the region have sought debt relief 
from their main foreign creditors: the interna-
tional private banks (see table 1). Whereas the 
scope of the present crisis has had no precedent 
since the Second World War, there is nothing 
new, in contrast, about the problem of servicing 
bank debt, or the consequent need to repro-
gramme it. Before payments difficulties —which 
were highlighted in August 1982 when Mexican 
authorities officially recognized servicing prob-
lems— began to be a matter of general concern, 
a good many countries of the region which had 
contracted substantial debts with the private 
banks had already been faced with a debt crisis. 
During the 1970s Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia and 
Jamaica were unable to meet their external debt 
commitments and accordingly decided to re-
quest from their private creditors a common for-
mula for the relief of their situation. 
Although the majority of the new requests 
for rescheduling are still being dealt with, they 
largely follow the general lines laid down by the 
private banks when the above-mentioned coun-
tries found themselves up against debt crises in 
the 1970s. Table 2 presents selected data on the 
agreements reached with the private banks by 
those Latin American countries that met with 
payments difficulties during the past decade. 
The study of these cases —together with others 
outside Latin America, such as those of Zaire 
and Sudan— makes it possible to sketch some 
essential features which give an idea of the char-
acter of the agreements concluded: 
a) Negotiations between the private banks 
and the debtor country constituted a very slow 
and at times highly conflictive process and it 
took one or two years to reach the final agree-
ments;1 
'See W. Glasser and D. Roberts, "Bank lending to de-
veloping countries. Problems and prospects", in Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Autumn, 1982, p. 27; 
and R. Devlin, Los bancos transnacionales y elfinanciamiento ex-
terno de América Launa: La experiencia del Perú, 1965-1976, 
Santiago, Chile, United Nations, 1980, E/CEPAL/G.1124, 
pp. 201-204. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: PROVISIONAL DATA ON THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE 
EXTERNAL DEBT OF SELECTED COUNTRIES TO PRIVATE BANKS 
































































































































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official information supplied by countries and by various national and international sources. 
Note: New credits are those granted by the international banks during the renegotiation process; (s) = solicited credits; BIS = Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements. 
As at 30 April 1983, most of the countries were in the midst of renegotiation operations, and although significant progress had been made, 
the process had not been finalized. 
Corresponds to amortization of public debt from 1982 and that falling due up to December 1983 (dS$ 6 billion). It also includes the pri-
vate external debt guaranteed by Central Bank exchange rate insurance and maturing as from November 1982 (US$ 5.5 billion), as well 
as to maturities relating to "swaps" (US$ 1.5 billion). 
At the end of March 1983 the international banks agreed to defer amortization and interest payments amounting to US$ 460 million, a plan 
that will be formalized by the signature of an agreement. 
At the end of 1982 a request was submitted to the foreign banks for new loans and refinancing amounting to US$ 4.4 billion and US$ 4.7 
billion respectively. In February 1983 the international banks acceded to this request. 
At the end of April 1983 it was reported that a provisional agreement had been signed with the leading creditor banks. 
In August 1982 a request was submitted for postponement of the external debt service payments falling due between September 1982 and 
December 1983. In March 1983 an agreement was reached with the creditor banks for refinancing to the amount of US$ 140 million. 
Includes amortization payments falling due in the course of 1983 and 1984 (US$2.1 billion) and the restructuring of short-term financial 
credits (US$ 1.2 billion). At the end of April the government stated that it had reached an agreement with the 12 principal creditor banks 
on debt rescheduling and that negotiations were continuing with a view to obtaining new credits. While the renegotiation process is being 
completed the banks will extend for a further three months the postponement of payments granted on 1 February 1983. 
Corresponds to servicing of the public debt between 1 November 1982 and 31 December 1983 (US$ 1 220 million) and about 80% of the 
private debt (US$ 1 260 million). In January 1983 an agreement was concluded with the international banks for the renegotiation of the 
public debt. Between October 1982 and January 1983 Ecuador, by common agreement with its creditors, had made no payments against 
the public debt. 
Corresponds to the postponement of amortization payments authorized by the international banks on 20 August 1982 for a period of three 
months, subsequently extended to 23 March 1983. In February 1983 part of the external debt was renegotiated, at a period of eight years 
(a four-year grace period), being secured for the payment of US$ 20 billion representing commitments between August 1982 and De-
cember 1984. Since renegotiation has not been fully completed, a further extension of the postponement of amortization payments up to 
August 1983 was requested. 
During 1982 renegotiation for this sum was concluded. 
This refers to the refinancing of short-term debt to the amount of US$ 2 billion obtained in March 1983 and a request to refinance amorti-
zation representing US$ 430 million in the same year. 
Corresponds to 90% of the amortization of short- and medium-term credits falling due in 1983 and 1984. At the beginning of March pay-
ments had been postponed for 90 days in agreement with the creditor banks. In April 1983 an agreement was reached with the committee 
of creditor banks. 
Relates to the short- and medium-term public and private debt which it is desired to convert into a long-term debt with new guarantees. 
At the end of March the government stated that it will postpone amortization payments corresponding to April-June 1983. 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DEBT RENEGOTIATION AGREEMENTS WITH 
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Source: Peru: R. Devlin, Los bancos transnacionales y el financiamiento externo de América Latina: La experiencia del Perú, 1965-1976, Santiago, Chile, 
United Nations, 1980, E/CEPAL/G. 1124, pp. 170 and 203. 
Nicaragua: R. Weinert, "Nicaragua's debt renegotiations", m Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 187-192. 
Bolivia: R. Devlin and M. Mortimore, Los bancos tmnsnacionaks. el Estado y el endeudamiento externo de Bolivia, Santiago, Chile, United Na-
tions, Estudióse Informes de la CEPAL, No. 26, E/CEPAL/G. 1251,1983, p. 67. 
Jamaica: Q. Peck Lin, "The borrower's trump card is his weakness", in Euromoney, October 1982, p. 37. 
a
 Excluding amounts and terms of payment for that part of the debt which was in arrears. 
b
 Expressed as percentages of the face value of the loan and represents a flat payment at the time of signing the contract. 
1
 The entire outstanding balance of the bank debt was rescheduled. 
d
 The margin gradually increases from 1 % to 1.75% while the agreement is in force, ending with an average of under 1.5%. Nicaragua pays 
a maximum rate of 7% up to the end of 1985. The difference between the current interest rate and the 7% ceiling will be capitalized and 
amortized between 1986 and 1990. 
c
 Paid at each maturity date. 
b) Whereas the countries had originally 
contracted their debt in the highly competitive 
and dynamic credit market of the 1970s, when 
they began to have difficulties with debt servi-
cing the credit environment deteriorated, since 
each bank attempted, on its own account, to re-
duce the borrower's participation in its loan 
portfolio; thus it was only a small group of very 
large banks that had to assume responsibility for 
seeking a common formula to tackle the prob-
lem;2 
c) The time horizon of the private banks' 
plan was very limited; i.e., the relief formula 
provided for an extension of only one or two 
years of maturities; furthermore, only amortiza-
tions were reprogrammed, since the banks in-
sisted that the borrower should not alter the 
schedule of interest payments; 
d) T h e renegotiation of the debt was 
linked to the attainment of a stand-by pro-
gramme with the IMF; 
e) The 'rescue' of borrowers did not in-
clude new loans; in effect, the renegotiation per 
se had a negative impact on a country's credit-
worthiness. Only in one case (Peru) was the bor-
rower subsequently able to regain normal access 
to external credit; and this, owing to a vigorous 
reactivation of the country's external sector 
—mainly thanks to a rise in the prices of mining 
products, especially petroleum, in 1979-1980— 
which revived bankers' interests in loan opera-
tions;3 
f) In renegotiation agreements the coun-
tries had to reckon with substantial increases in 
spreads over the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) and pay heavy commissions to the pri-
vate banks on the occasion of signing the corres-
ponding contracts; 
2R. Devlin, "Commercial bank finance from the 
North and the economic development of the South: congru-
ence and conflict", in CEPAL Review No. 9, Santiago, 1979, 
p. 69. 
3See R. Devlin, Los bancos transnationales..., E7CEPAIV 
G.l 124, op. cit., p. 204; and W. Glasser and D. Roberts, op. 
cit., p . 27. 
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g) During negotiations the private banks 
exerted influence, in various ways, on the 
economic policy of the country concerned;4 
and, lastly, 
h) As a rule, the original renegotiations 
were followed by successive similar opera-
tions,5 since the relief afforded by the private 
banks did not lighten the debt burden suffi-
ciently to prevent a rapid recrudescence of debt 
servicing difficulties; all this, of course, resulted 
ín additional costs for the borrower. 
A very significant departure from this gen-
eral pattern is to be found in one case, that of 
Nicaragua. The agreement concluded by the 
Nicaraguan Government in 1981 is of great im-
portance because it established a new principle 
ín the field of renegotiation of external debt. 
When other countries encountered payments 
difficulties, the banks rescheduled the debt to 
avert the precedent of a default. But when they 
granted a restructuring of maturities, they ap-
plied strictly private payment criteria; that is, 
their aim was to minimize their own risks, to 
maintain or increase the rate of return on their 
assets and to impose a measure of 'discipline' on 
the borrower. The resulting agreement was ex-
tremely burdensome for the debtor, and left lit-
tle or no room for economic growth. In con-
The Nicaraguan plan should have served as a 
general pattern for the rescheduling of Latin 
America's external debt; but unfortunately this 
has not happened. The renegotiation which im-
See R. Devlin, Los bancos transnacionales..., op. cit., pp. 
162-204; and R. Devlin and M. Mortimore, Los bancos trans-
nacionales, el Estado y el endeudamiento externo en Bolivia, San-
tiago, United Nations, Estudios e Informes de la Cepal, No. 
26.E/CEPAI/G.1261, 1983, Chapter 4. 
5See W. Glasser and D. Roberts, op. cit., p. 27. 
trast, the reprogramming of Nicaragua's debt 
was largely based on development criteria, as is 
reflected in the fact that it included a lengthy 
postponement of a considerable proportion of 
interest payments and unusually long 
maturities. 
The characteristics of the Nicaraguan 
agreement can be appreciated in table 2 and in 
the article by R. Weinert cited in that table. For 
the purposes of the present paper, a singular 
feature should be highlighted: the economic au-
thorities of Nicaragua managed to pay neither 
an increase in the margin over LIBOR nor com-
missions to the banks on the amount of the re-
scheduled debt. The present analysis —al-
though it is in any event only a first step in com-
plicated terrain— argues that commissions, in-
creased spreads over LIBOR, and other forms of 
raising the cost of credit on rescheduled debt 
are no other than monopoly rents, or super-
profits, gained by the private banks. Con-
sequently, the Latin American countries that are 
currently renegotiating their debt might seri-
ously explore means of totally or partly elimi-
nating these rents —as Nicaragua has already 
done—, through negotiation of debt resched-
ulings that do not imply the payment of commis-
sions or increases in the margin over LIBOR. 
mediately followed that of Nicaragua was the 
one embarked upon by the Bolivian military 
government under the presidency of General 
García Meza, in 1980-1981. This country 
showed many signs of insolvency which made it 
eligible for a relief formula in the spirit of the 
Nicaraguan agreement. But that shaky govern-
ment, which was seeking international legitimi-
zation, was willing to accept a rescheduling ar-
rangement at virtually any price. The result was 
an unrealistic reprogramming of the debt which 
did nothing to help stabilize the balance of pay-
II 
Is there any economic justification for the spreads 
and commissions charged by the private banks 
in debt reschedulings? 
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ments, and of which, moreover, the cost for the 
country was very high (see again table 2).6 
During the present debt crisis, Mexico is 
the country that seems to be nearest to finalizing 
a reprogramming operation with the private 
banks. But once again the terms of the agree-
ment are very burdensome. According to provi-
sional data, the US$ 20 billions of amortization 
payments subject to reprogramming will be fi-
nanced at the cost of a margin of 1.88% over 
LIBOR and flat commissions of 1% on the 
amount rescheduled.7 Furthermore, the pri-
vate banks will grant a 'new' loan for US$ 5 bil-
lion, which in practice is a disguised way of re-
scheduling part of the interest payments on the 
outstanding debt. The cost of this last 'loan' will 
be 2.25% over LIBOR and flat commissions of 
1.25%.8 And since Mexico was accustomed to 
paying an average margin of approximately 
0.65% over LIBOR and commissions of 0.7%, 
the need to reschedule the debt induced that 
part of the cost of credit which is subject to 
negotiation to increase by over 180%9 (see 
table 3). 
In most respects the rescheduling of 
Mexico's debt follows the general pattern out-
lined in the introduction. Its new feature is that 
the private banks —under severe pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund— are now 
granting the aforesaid 'new' loans to accompany 
the rescheduling of certain maturities. But, as 
was also pointed out above, the loan does not 
imply additional net autonomous resources for 
investment or for the accumulation of interna-
tional reserves; rather it is administratively de-
signed by the bankers to permit normal pay-
ment of interest in the absence of an official re-
scheduling of these commitments.10 
In some circles the Mexican formula has 
6See R. Devlin and M. Mortimore, op. cit., chapter 7. 
7See Latin American Weekly Report, London, 24 De-
cember 1982, p . 1. 
8Ibidem. 
9LIBOR is determined by the forces of supply and 
demand in the financial market. The cost components sub-
ject to negotiation are the following: the margin over 
LIBOR, flat commissions and the amortization period. 
1 0Up to now the private bankers have Firmly adhered 
to the principle that inte»est payments must not be repro-
grammed. This attitude partly reflects their concern lest if 
they reschedule interest payments their government ban-
been mentioned as the model that should be fol-
lowed by other countries in the region for re-
scheduling their payments to the private banks. 
In practice, as is clear from table 3, this model is 
pretty close to what is actually happening in 
Latin America. Reprogramming terms are very 
similar for all countries despite the considerable 
differences in their capacities to pay. The rela-
tive deterioration of credit terms for the other 
countries of the region is not as grave as for 
Mexico, inasmuch as the latter started with 
more favourable terms of borrowing; but in any 
event, the deterioration is serious in almost all 
cases. 
Obviously, the Mexican model ought not 
to have been taken as a reference point for con-
sidering the terms of the region's debt re-
scheduling. Mexico accepted a substantial rise in 
the spread over LIBOR and the payment of 
commissions on the reprogrammed debt. As will 
be explained later, in that country's particular 
circumstances it may possibly have been expe-
dient for the authorities to accept these costs; 
but it is not necessarily the correct formula for 
all the other Latin American countries. 
While ethical arguments can be invoked to 
dissuade the private banks from increasing the 
cost of rescheduled debts, there is also an eco-
nomic argument which calls this practice in ques-
tion. Higher spreads and commissions paid on 
reprogrammed debt and interest represent 
monopoly rents for the private banks, which 
theoretically, and in practice too, can be appro-
priated by the borrower countries. It is possible, 
moreover, that non-payment of these rents may 
have no significant negative effect on the supply 
of external financing. 
In the first place, the margin over the base 
interest rate and the commissions are compo-
nents of the 'negotiated' cost of credit.11 In a 
normal international credit market this cost is 
established in a distinctly competitive environ-
ment, since a solvent borrower country has 
many potential creditors.12 Accordingly, in a 
king authorities may classify loans as non-performing as-
sets. Thus they resort to indirect procedures to serve the 
same end. 
1
 'See again footnote 9. 
12A country like Bolivia, whose prestige in interna-
tional financial markets has always been relatively low, had 
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Table 3 
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Source: ECI.A, on the basis of official data and information supplied by various national and international sources. 
* This information is provisional and subject to revision. Columns headed 1980-1981 show average credit terms in 1980 and the first half of 
1981. Columns headed R relate to rescheduled maturities. Columns headed AC relate to terms for additional credits. It should be noted that 
by the end of April 1983 most of the new credits had not been agreed upon and were still at the proposal stage. 
b
 Calculated as percentages of the face value of the loans and represents a flat payment at the time of signing the loan contracts. 
c







C = commissions; P = amortization period; M = margin over LIBOR; all of which are weighted by the 
amount of the loan. It should be noted that the relative deterioration is not in itself an indicator of the 
quality of an individual country's negotiation, since it is strongly influenced by the initial position of the 
borrower. 
Weighted average. 
competitive setting like that in which most of the 
debt was contracted, the spread and commis-
sions paid by the borrower must generate what 
for the private banks approximates a 'normal 
rate of profit', which takes into account a mar-
gin to cover risks. 
In an advanced phase of the credit cycle, 
however, the borrowing country may find itself 
faced with debt service difficulties. In these cir-
cumstances, the financial market drastically 
tightens since many private banks try to reduce 
the amount of their portfolio in the country 
concerned. As was pointed out before, the coun-
try then finds itself in a non-competitive mar-
more than a hundred private creditors in 1974-1978. See R. 
Devlin and M. Mortimore, op. cit., p. 69. Countries whose 
prestige in financial markets is traditionally high could deal 
with more than a thousand private banks. 
ket; the cost of credit will now be largely decided 
by the few large creditor banks that form a com-
mittee for negotiating en bloc with the bor-
rower.13 The collusive nature of the committee 
invests the private banks with a monopoly 
power that did not exist at the time when the 
borrower originally contracted its debt. 
In reality, this situation approximates a 
bilateral monopoly. In other words, the banks 
and the borrower country open negotiations 
with one another to decide how the losses will be 
shared out. The outcome of this situation is un-
certain. But the action of the private banks is 
clear: raising the price of credit on rescheduled 
debt is a device for shifting on to the debtor 
lsSee R. Devlin, "jLos bancos comerciales...", op. cit., p. 
84. For an analysis of a specific case, see, by the same author, 
Los bancos transnacionaUst.., op. cit., pp. 163-173. 
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much of the cost of a weak loan portfolio. In so 
far as the bank avoids losses —or manages to ob-
tain positive returns— on its weak portfolio, it 
gains profits tantamount to a monopoly rent. 
When a bank issues a loan in a normal 
market, the risk is theoretically covered by cred-
it rationing, and the charge of a margin over the 
base interest rate, plus commissions. In other 
words, at the time of granting a loan, the bank 
already takes into account the possibility of not 
recovering it, or at least foresees that the mobil-
ity of its portfolio may be affected by a re-
scheduling of payments. Thus, when a bor-
rower country cannot meet its debt service com-
mitments, the cost to the bank must already 
have been included in the charges for the origi-
nal loan. And as regards the reprogramming of 
the debt per se (or of the interest on it, either di-
rectly or indirectly), there is no real 'credit' 
transaction with a supply price, since the opera-
tion consists simply in the administration of a 
loan already granted and not immediately re-
coverable. Nor does rescheduling imply an ad-
ditional risk, as bankers assert, since the alterna-
tive is a total stoppage of payments and the com-
plete liquidation of part of the portfolio; in 
practice, rescheduling effectively reduces the 
risk of default and therefore of major losses. As 
for the outlays on telex, cables, travel, etc., con-
nected with the negotiation of a rescheduling 
operation, the banks have already provided for 
their coverage in the loan contracts, in separate 
clauses under the head of 'miscellaneous ex-
penses'. Thus, any increase in the margin over 
the base interest rate and payment of commis-
sions on the amount reprogrammed signifies 
rent; that is, it constitutes an income in excess of 
economic costs, which is generated b^ y virtue of 
the bargaining power of the few large banks 
that control access to credit for a country of 
questionable creditworthiness. Looked at from 
another angle, rent is any payment over and 
above what is required to induce an economic 
agent to act as it does. In this case, the bank 
charges extra for an administrative operation 
(the rescheduling of debt service) which is nec-
essary in any event to avoid a total loss; there-
fore, the additional income it receives on re-
programming the debt is a superprofit. 
What happened during the 1930s, i.e., 
when the debtor countries ceased to liquidate 
their bonds unilaterally, demonstrates how, in 
similar competitive conditions, banks would 
have to accept the losses deriving from the de-
velopment of an unsatisfactory portfolio, a 
course which would imply easing the debt bur-
den of the borrower countries and would facili-
tate their economic recovery. Unlike the current 
financial instrument, the bond is a means of 
borrowing in which case the creditors are 
anonymous, many, and widely scattered, so that 
it is difficult for them to organize themselves 
and reach a collusive agreement vis-à-vis the debt-
ors. Bondholders were left with no other al-
ternative than to accept the losses determined 
by the market in the shape of a reduction of the 
value of their assets.14 
Today, borrowing is channelled mainly 
through the private banks, and these institu-
tions are in a position to co-ordinate their ac-
tivities in the international scene in such a way 
that they can form a monopolistic bloc or-
ganized with the aim of averting, or minimizing, 
losses through: i) reschedulings of the debt and 
of interest payments; and ii) charging onerous 
spreads and commissions. In other words, in 
contrast to what happened during the 1930s, 
the cost of the adjustment necessitated by a less 
than adequate management of an international 
portfolio is now borne by the debtors and not, as 
before, by the creditors. 
In certain circumstances it would be expe-
dient for the borrower country to attempt, as 
Nicaragua did, to eliminate or reduce the rent 
paid to the private banks. This is feasible be-
cause, as will be seen later, a decline in the 
superprofits of the private banks, given specific 
situations, would not necessarily affect the sup-
ply of financing. 
When debt servicing becomes impossible, 
the borrower country loses its creditworthiness 
and therewith its access to autonomous loans 
from the private banks. It seems that many 
countries accept the increase in the cost of 
credit in a reprogramming operation —i.e., pay 
the rents— in the fear that if they refuse to do 
so they will forfeit their chances of obtaining fi-
14This last aspect is discussed in a working paper by 
Carlos Massad. 
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nancing in the future. l a But in normal cir-
cumstances the flow of loans is not tied to the 
concession or non-concession of rents to cred-
itors. Access to credit will then depend upon 
sound creditworthiness; in so far as a country 
can recover it, the number of private banks in-
terested in lending to it will increase and the re-
surgence of competition among them will gen-
erate new loans at lower costs.16 And not-
withstanding the negative attitude of bankers 
towards debt rescheduling, a major factor in the 
real recovery of creditworthiness is still —in ad-
dition to disciplined economic policies, of 
course— renegotiation of debt servicing in such 
a way as to reduce the burden it represents; this, 
In the short run, the incentives that the various 
countries have to accept the higher cost of bor-
rowing involved in renegotiations may differ 
considerably, and this has major repercussions 
on rescheduling trends in the region. 
In the case of the large countries with a 
very high absolute level of indebtedness —such 
as Mexico and Brazil— payment of the higher 
cost of credit might be expedient. And this be-
cause even in an 'administered' credit market, 
15Another reason that may explain, if only in part, 
why some countries have paid the rent in question is that 
hitherto, in many instances, negotiations with the private 
banks have been co-ordinated by national technocrats (not by 
politicians) who have strong professional links with the in-
ternational financial community. This situation makes for 
protection of the statu quo as regards debt rescheduling. 
l 6Peru affords a case in point. Between 1976 and 
1978 it had extremely serious conflicts with its private cred-
itors and received no new loans for nearly two years. But 
despite its troubled relations with the private banks, the 
country found itself back in their good books when an unex-
pected rise in its export prices boosted its external sector 
and, therefore, its image of creditworthiness. See R. Devlin, 
Los bancos transnacionales..,, op. cit., pp. 167-172, and 201-
204. 
in turn, entails the borrower's not paying the 
rents and transferring to the lender some of the 
corresponding losses. Hitherto the creditor has 
avoided losses and has managed to oblige the 
debtor to pay rents which have militated against 
a recovery of creditworthiness and have been 
partly responsible for the necessity of multiple 
reschedulings with their additional costs for the 
borrower.17 In fact, instead of being a problem 
for the banks, rescheduling has definitely been 
'good business'; thus a paradoxical situation 
arises where in the midst of a very serious de-
terioration of their international*loan portfolio, 
the private banks are reporting to their 
shareholders very high rates of profit.18 
which characterizes the situation for a State 
whose creditworthiness is precarious, the 
economic authorities may possibly think that a 
substantial volume of new loans can gradually 
be obtained, since, up to a point, the financial 
system is a 'hostage' to the borrower: a default 
by a major debtor would be a threat to the very 
survival of many banks. Thus, the economic au-
thorities might feel that acceptance of the in-
crease in the cost of outstanding debts would 
make il, easier for them to use their considerable 
17In so far as the banks increase the cost of credit in 
a rescheduling operation, the recovery of creditworthiness 
becomes more difficult, since the borrower country will have 
to expand its exports still further and reduce its imports in 
order to cope with debt servicing. Creditworthiness is also 
prejudiced inasmuch as the cost of the debt rises when the 
internal rate of return is, in all probability, very low. 
l8See R. Lambert, "New York banks show strong 
gains", in Financial Times, 19 January 1983, p. 32; R. Ban-
ner, "Banks gain from fees by altering Latin debt", New York 
Times, 10 January 1983, p. D.3; J. Plender, "Of profits and 
imprudence", Financial Times, 18 February 1983, p . 5; and 
R. Wilkinson, "Banks greedy over Third World", Financial 
Times, H March 1983, p. 10. 
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leverage to extract increasing amounts of new 
credit from a non-competitive market.19 
Another factor that perhaps influences the deci-
sions of these relatively more developed coun-
tries is the consideration that they will be the 
first to benefit by the positive impulses of any 
world economic recovery that may occur in 
1983 and 1984, with the consequent improve-
ment of their creditworthiness accompanied by 
a renewed autonomous credit flow and the re-
duction in costs which this implies. Undoubtedly 
Mexico, when accepting the cost of its debt re-
scheduling, assumed that it would relatively rap-
idly regain its access to credit, through auto-
nomous or administered channels. If within a 
very short time there is no new net inflow of 
loans {i.e., a volume of credit in excess of amor-
tization and interest payments), the cost of re-
negotiation will be more clearly revealed as a 
monopoly rent and, probably, in that case, the 
Mexican Government will reconsider its strategy 
for negotiation with the private banks. 
While in the short run the most heavily in-
debted countries may have their reasons for ac-
cepting a rise in the cost of their debt, the cred-
itor banks have motives for augmenting those 
costs to an onerous degree. And this because 
they know that the terms of payment established 
with the major debtors —which are also the 
countries with the best prospects of regaining 
their creditworthiness— will form the 'floor' for 
subsequent negotiations with smaller debtors 
that are less attractive customers. Thus, the 
strategies of the banks and of the major debtors 
in the region join forces in pushing up the cost 
of the debt for everyone. This, of course, has 
negative repercussions on the remaining coun-
tries. 
As regards the small and medium-sized 
debtor countries, the potential benefits of pay-
ing the higher cost demanded by the banks are 
even more problematical. These countries' 
l9Resources are often extracted indirectly. Initially 
the country establishes very optimistic balance-of-payments 
targets in order to conclude a rescheduling agreement with 
the private banks. Subsequently the targets are not met with 
the consequent enlargement of the deficit on current ac-
count, which is in any event financed by the private banks 
(or by their governments) on the grounds of not inducing a 
moratorium in payments. 
chances of obtaining net inflows of resources 
through the private banks are much smaller. In 
a climate of administered credit they have not 
enough leverage to obtain more money for in-
vestment purposes, since individually their debt 
does not represent a high proportion of the 
banks' porfolio; in the last instance, creditors 
could cope with a unilateral moratorium on the 
part of a small debtor without endangering their 
own survival.20 Thus, the banks have a firm 
foundation on which to resist a significant ex-
pansion of their portfolio in the country. But still 
more important is the fact that these countries 
will be the last to benefit by the return to a nor-
malized international credit market when the 
world economy recovers. In the case of coun-
tries with structural debt problems —for exam-
ple, Bolivia, Chile, Jamaica, Costa Rica—, even 
if the international conjuncture takes a favour-
able turn it will not necessarily suffice to restore 
their creditworthiness and give them renewed 
access to autonomous credit. 
The preceding remarks suggest that these 
latter borrowers have less reason to accept the 
increase in the cost of debt currently at issue 
in the renegotiations; if they do so, in face of 
their poor prospects of a rapid and intensive re-
covery of creditworthiness —necessary for their 
reinsertion in a competitive credit market— 
they have few possibilities of demanding as a 
counterpart any very significant net flow of new 
loans. If the borrower holds out against an in-
crease in the cost of the debt, its rescheduling 
will not necessarily be prevented. And this be-
cause, although the banks could absorb the 
losses that would derive from a formal declara-
tion of default on any one country, it is very 
much in their interest to forestall a precedent of 
this kind. In the first place, such a declaration 
might lead to a similar standstill of debt pay-
ments on the part of other countries which, as a 
whole, certainly would represent a threat to the 
viability of the private banks. And secondly, 
since it is monopoly rents that are at stake, a pol-
icy that tries to obtain debt rescheduling without 
an increase in the cost of credit still affords the 
20See for example, the cases of Peru and Bolivia, in R. 
Devlin, Los bancos transnacionales..., op. cit., pp. 114 to 120, 
and R. Devlin and M. Mortimore, op. cit., pp. 111 to 116, re-
spectively. 
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private banks an opportunity to 'gain', i.e., sub-
stantially to minimize their losses. All that is re-
ally involved is a better distribution of costs be-
tween debtor and creditor, as compared with 
the situation in the 1930s, when the brunt of the 
It is worth while to recapitulate what has been 
said so far. The hypothesis upon which the pre-
sent article is based calls in question the current 
practices of the private banks in renegotiation of 
the external debt, hitherto more or less taken 
for granted in many circles alike in the North 
and in the South. Obviously, this is only a first 
approximation to the subject, and the analytical 
framework should be extended in the near fu-
ture both in depth and in breadth. In any case, 
the increase in the price of credit in current re-
schedulings of Latin America's debt is a clever 
tactic on the part of the private banks to evade 
the costs associated with a less than adequate in-
ternational lending policy. Their capacity to 
raise the borrower's costs derives from the 
monopolistic power which characterizes an ad-
ministered capital market; and the costs them-
selves would be rents. 
T h e payment of rents has different effects 
on the two parties involved in the renegotiation. 
In the case of the banks, their rates of profit are 
high even in the face of a marked deterioration 
in the quality of their portfolio. And the debt-
ors, for their part, are faced with a steep rise 
in the cost of the debt when their rate of return 
on investments can no longer carry the burden 
of servicing it; moreover, payment of the higher 
cost necessitates an increase in exports and a 
reduction of imports which are difficult for each 
country to achieve separately, and virtually im-
possible for all the debtors as a whole. It has also 
been noted that, paradoxically, in the short run 
it is the countries with the most bargaining power 
that have an incentive to initially shoulder the 
burden of the increased cost of credit, whereas 
the debtors with less leverage have less reason to 
adjustment was borne by the creditors (who 
were not only banks), and with the present 
situation, which is characterized by the transfer 
of the cost of a weak portfolio to the debtor 
countries. 
do so, and are in a better position to resist it 
forthwith. 
Up to now the small and medium-sized 
debtor countries of Latin America have adopted 
a distincdy passive position vis-à-vis the demands 
of the private banks for exceptional increases in 
the margins over LIBOR and for the payment 
of commissions on the reprogrammed debt.21 
But perhaps they ought to reconsider their 
strategy and explore other ways of negotiating a 
reduction or elimination of the rents paid to 
these transnational financial enterprises, as 
many of them have already done in the past 
with respect to direct investment by the non-fi-
nancial transnational corporations. And as hap-
pened in the latter case, the possibilities of 
negotiating better terms will depend upon the 
specific political and economic circumstances of 
each individual country, on its capacity to co-op-
erate with other debtors and on its success in ob-
taining the necessary backing from interna-
tional forums concerned with co-operation and 
economic development in order to pressure 
the private banks to change their rescheduling 
policies. 
As a minimum criterion it might be pro-
posed that the negotiated cost of a repro-
grammed debt should not be higher than the av-
erage of the original negotiated cost on the re-
scheduled maturities. And in the case of coun-
2 lEven an organ of the international financial press 
—the Financial Times of London— remarked in an editorial 
that the developing countries have a great deal of leverage 
with the private banks, but have shown little imagination in 
taking advantage of it. See "Third World leverage', Financial 
Times, 12 February 1983, p. 12. 
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tries with structural debt problems, a postpone-
ment of interest payments would be necessary, 
although a still more appropriate measure 
would be a significant reduction of the cost of 
credit, i.e., a 'concessionary' interest rate. Fur-
thermore, the formula is not without precedent, 
since the private banks commonly grant 'soft' 
credit terms to their domestic customers with 
debt repayment difficulties, as is exemplified by 
the treatment of the Real Estate Investment 
Trusts in the United States.22 A yet more im-
portant point however, is that reduction of the 
rents implicit in the current debt rescheduling 
formulas still affords the banks an opportunity 
to avoid most of the losses that creditors would 
normally incur in a competitive capital market. 
It is simply a matter of a better sharing-out of 
the cost of a mismanaged portfolio between cred-
itor and debtor, whereby both parties 'gain'. In 
addition, this improved distribution of the cost 
will make for a more rapid restoration of the 
creditworthiness of the debtors and will thereby 
enable the private banks to infuse new 
dynamism into their portfolio. 
In conclusion, it is important to mention 
that the central argument of the foregoing anal-
ysis with respect to the cost of debt rescheduling 
is highly sensitive to the assumptions adopted in 
relation to risk. It has been assumed that the pri-
vate banks had already taken into account the 
risks of default at the actual time of granting 
loans to the debtor countries. But there are 
bankers and regulatory bank authorities who as-
sert" that the former spreads over LIBOR and 
commissions were insufficient to cover these 
risks; and this phenomenon is often attributed 
to the 'fierce competition' among banks during 
the 1970s. Thus, it is maintained that the cur-
rent increase in the cost of credit on resched-
uling a debt is nothing but an 'adjustment' on ac-
count of the insufficient price of the credit 
granted during the competitive phase of the in-
ternational credit market. 
This argument is not very convincing. If 
the negotiated price of credit was insufficient in 
the 1970s, the cause was not the existence of a 
highly competitive market; rather it must be at-
22See R. Weinert, "Banks and bankruptcy", Foreign 
Policy, No. 50, 1983, pp. 138 to 149. 
tributed to a faulty assessment of risk. The 
private banks made their loans in the 1970s on 
the basis of a principle which was then widely ac-
cepted by the financial community: that coun-
tries (sovereign borrowers) never go bank-
rupt.23 This assumption is technically correct, 
but as a general criterion for loans it seriously 
underestimates the potential costs involved in 
the development of a portfolio in developing 
countries. 
In any event, let us assume that —what-
ever may have been the reasons— in the 1970s 
the price of credit was not high enough to en-
sure the long-term stability of the international 
financial system. Why should the developing 
countries be responsible for bearing the cost im-
plied in remedying the situation? If the interna-
tional financial system did not function effi-
ciently during the past decade, in a civilized and 
interdependent world it is incumbent upon all 
the members of that system —private banks, cen-
tral governments, debtor countries— to seek 
solutions and share the cost. Shifting the cost on 
to the debtors alone —as is occurring today— is 
questionable from the point of view of equity and 
ethics. But it is also questionable from the 
standpoint of the economic interests of the cred-
itors and their governments: many debtors are 
clearly unable to bear the whole cost of the ad-
justment, and, failing more equitable solutions, 
the dynamics of their internal politics would ul-
timately involve them in prolonged moratoria 
which nobody wants to see on the international 
scene. Accordingly, the present cost that would 
be implied for the banks in sharing the burden 
of the adjustment is much lower than might be 
the future cost of perpetuating the practices 
24 
now current. 
23See Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Mar-
kets, March 1983, pp. 4-5; and Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, 
"Latin American debt", in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983, 
p. 352. 
24Fred Bergston, formerly Assistant Secretary for In-
ternational Economic Affairs of the United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury, under the James Carter administra-
tion, is very well aware of the danger: "...a moratorium by 
any significant debtor would have a demonstration effect on 
other debtors, or at least on opposition politicians in such 
countries, to emulate such behaviour. A 'debtors' O P E C is 
unlikely to emerge by design, but could develop via chain 
reaction". See F. Bergston, "Can we prevent a world 
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Of course it is possible that the interna-
tional banks are not financially in a position to 
take on the whole of their share of the cost of 
adjustment with the debtors; if this is the case, it 
will fall to the central governments to absorb it. 
There are already a good many proposals that 
advocate the transfer of much of the interna-
tional financial problem to the centre's public 
sector.25 For example, Professor Peter Kenen, 
of Princeton University, has suggested that the 
World Bank might purchase a proportion of the 
banks' portfolio at a discount, which would en-
able the creditors to divest themselves of weak 
loans (although, of course, at a partial loss).26 
Thus, an international public institution such 
as the World Bank, which perceives risk in a 
economic crisis?", in Challenge, January- February 1983, p. 
10. Furthermore, the potential for setting up a 'debtors' 
O P E C in Latin America is very great, since over 90% of the 
net bank debt of the periphery is to be found in the region. 
See R. Devlin and M. Mortimore, op. cit., table 1. 
25See, for example, "Bad debtors' charter", in The 
Economist, 19-25 February 1983, p. 79. 
26R. Weinert, op. cit., also puts forward an excellent 
practical proposal implying the transfer of part of the pri-
vate banks' portfolio to the World Bank. 
broader perspective than private banks would 
help the debtors to find more satisfactory for-
mulas for the relief of their situation. Again, the 
Government of Mexico has proposed that the 
International Monetary Fund provide a 
special service for the financing of balance-of-
payments deficits due to increases in interna-
tional interest rates; this would make it possible 
to grant compensatory loans to the debtor coun-
tries during the period in which interest rates 
exceed 'normal' levels, i.e., 2-3% in real terms. 
There are also other interesting proposals for 
palliating the pressures faced today by the inter-
national financial system and the debt crisis of 
the periphery. All that is wanting is the political 
capacity to adopt the appropriate decisions. The 
underlying reason for the proposal considered 
here in relation to the creditors' governments is 
analogous to that adduced in the case of the 
banks: the cost of sharing the burden of the ad-
justment between the banks, their governments 
and the debtor countries would now be much 
less than it would be in the future in the event of 
the creditors' perpetuating their current prac-
tices, which are seriously prejudicial to Latin 
America's economic and social development 
and are politically untenable for the debtor 
countries. 
